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Accueil > Actualités

Séminaire CIRED : Laurent Lamy et Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet

par Arancha Sánchez - publié le

Important : Le séminaire du CIRED reprend au créneau habituel mais en visioconférence. Pour vous connecter, merci de contacter Antoine Missemer.






Résumé / Abstract


We consider an externality-generating good in an imperfectly competitive market : a finite set of firms with convex production costs decide in an uncoordinated way whether to incur a visiting cost and participate in separate procurements each organised by consumers willing to buy a personalized good. We find that when the ex post first best involves mixed participation (resp. full participation), then it is implemented through a Pigovian (resp. super-Pigovian) subsidy coupled with no visit subsidies. We then analyse the ex post optimal regulation in terms of ex ante incentives and also discuss how our results extend or not to different auction rules, ad valorem instruments or with heterogeneous consumers. Our results give a large support for Pigovian subsidies possibly coupled with a regulation on firms’ entry.


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